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States of Consciousness in the history of science have ,been Would you risk going to jail to exCopernican astronomy and Newtonian perience these?
An ASC may be defined for the dynmics. A young marijuana smoker who purposes of this article as a qualitative Because of their ,tremendous smcess, hears a scientist or physician talk about alteration in the overall pattern of these findings as the basic nature of mental functioning, such that the ex-atTg $2; E z g : : ; ~~f~~~ marijuana intoxication will simply sneer periencer feels his oonsciousness is fornia,:Davis 95616 paradigms undergo a change which, in principle, ordinary scientific theories d o not undergo. An ordinary scientific theory is always subject to further questioning and testing as it is extended. A paradigm becomes an implicit framework for most scien,tists working within it; it is the natural way of looking at things and doing things. It does not seriously occur to the adherents of a paradigm to question it any more (we may ignore, for the moment, the occurrence of scientific revo1,utions). Theories become referred to as laws: people talk of the law of gravity, not the theory of gravity, for example.
A paradigm serves to concentrate the attention of a researcher on sensible problem areas and to prevent him from wasting his ti,me on w.hat might be trivia. On the other hand, by implicitly definicg some lines of research as trivial or nonsensical, a paradigm acts like a blinder. Kuhn has discussed this blinding function as a key factor in the lack of effective ~om~munications during paradigm clashes.
The concept of a paradigm and of an SoC are quite similar. Both constitute complex, interlocking sets of rules and theories that enable a person t o Interact with and interpret experiences within an environme2.t. In both cases, the rules are largely implicit. They are not recognized as tentative working hypotheses; they operate automatically and t,he person feels he is doing the obvious or natural thing.
Paradigm Clash between "Straight" and "Hip"
Human beings become emotionally attached to the things which give them pleasure, and a scientist ma'king importa,nt progress within a particular parad~gm becomes emotionally attached to it. When data which make no sense in terms of the (implicit) paradigm are brought to our attention, the usual result is not a reevaluation o f the paradigm, but a rejection or misperception of the data. This rejection seems rational to others sharing that paradigm and irrational or rationalizing to others committed to a different paradigm.
The conflict now existing between those who have experienced certain ASC's (whose ranks include many young scientists) and those who have not is very much a paradigmatic m nflict. For example, a subject takes LSD, and tells his invtstigator that "You and I, we are all ont, there are no separate selves." The invtstigator reports that his subject showed a "confused sense of identity and disrorted thinking process." The subject is rtporting what is obvious to him, the investigator is reporting what is obvious to him. The i,nvestigator's implicit paradigm, based on his scientific training, his cultural ,background, and his normal SoC, indicates that a literal interpretation of the subject's statement cannot be true, and therefore must be interpreted as mental dysfunction on the part of the subject. The subject, his paradigms radically changed for the moment by being in an ASC, not only rtports what is obviously true to him, but perceives the investigator as showing mental dysfunction, by virtue of i>ein,g incapable of perceiving the obvious! Historically, paradigm clashes have been characterized by bitter emotional antagonisms, and total rejection of the opponent. Currently we are seeing the same sort of process: the respectable psychiatrist, u-ha would not take any of those "psychotomimetic" drugs himself or sit down and experience that crazy meditation process, carries out re-. search to show that drug takers and those who practice meditation are escapists. The drug taker or meditator views the same investigator as narrowminded, prejudic-d, and repressive, and as a result drops out of the university. Communication between the two factions is almost nil.
Must the experiencers of ASC's continue to see the scientists as concentrating on the irrelevant, and the scientists see the esperiencers as confused ( 7 ) or mentally ill? O r can science deal adequately with the experiences of these people? The thesis I shall now present in detail is that we ca,n deal with the important aspects of ASC's using the essence of scientific method, even though a variety of nonessentials, unfortunately identi,fied with current science, hinder such an effort.
The Nature of Knowledge
Basically, science (from the Latin scire, to know) deals with knowledge. Knowledge may be defined as an immediately given experiential feeling of congruence between two different kinds of experience. a matching. One set of experiences may be regarded as perceptions of the external world, of others, of oneself; the second set may be regarded as a theory, a scheme, a system of understanding. The feeling of congruence is something iimmediately given in experience, alth.ough many refinements have been worked out for judging degrees of congruence.
All knowledge, then, is basically experiential knowledge. Even my kno,wledge of the physical world can be reduced to this: given certain sets of experiences, which I (by assumption) attribute to the external world activating my sensory apparatus, i,t may be possible for me to compare them with purely inte~nal experiences (memories, previous knowledge) and predict with a high degree of reliability other kinds of experiences, which I again attri~bute to the external world.
Because science has been incredibly successful in dea1in.g with the physical world, i,t has been historically associated with a philosophy of physicalism, the belief that reality is all reducbble to certain kinds of physical entities. The vast majority of phenomena of ASC's have no known physical manifestatiom: thus to physicalistic philosophy they are epiphenomena, not worthy of study. But insofar as science deals with knowledge, it need not restrict itself only to physical kinds of knowledge.
The Essence of Scientific Method
I shall disouss the essence of scientific method, and show that this essence is perfectly compatible with an enlarged study of the important phenomena of ASC's. In particular, I propose that state-specific sciences (SSS) be developed.
As satisfying as the feeling of knowing can be, we are often wron,g: what seems like congruence at first later does not match, or has no generality. Man has learned that his reasoning is often faulty, his observations are often incomplete or mistaken, and that emotional and other nonconscious factors can seriously distort both reasoning and observational processes. His reli,ance on authorities, "rationality" or "elegance," are no sure criteria for achieving truth. The development of scientific method may be seen as a determined effort to systematize the process of acquiring knowledge in such a way as to minimize the various pitfalls of observation and reasoning.
I shall discuss four basic rules of scientific method to which an investigator is committed: (i) good observation; (ii) the public nature of observation; (iii) the necessity to theorize logically; and (iv) the testing of theory by observable consequences; all these constitute the scientific enterprise. I shall consider the wider application of each mle to ASC's and indicate how unnecessary physicalistic restrictions may be dropped. I will show that all these commitments or rules can be accommodated in the development of SSS's that I propose.
Observation
The scientist is committed to observe as well as possible the phenomena of interest and to search constantly for better ways of making these observations. But our paradigmatic com,mitments, our SoC's, make us likely to observe certain parts of reality and to ignore or observe with error cer,tain other parts of it.
Many of the most important phenomena of ASC's have been observed pooriy or not at all because of the physicalistic labeling of them as epiphenomena, so that they have been called "subjective," "ephemeral," "unreliable," or "unscientific." Obseflations of internal processes are probably much more difficult .to make than those of external physical processes, because of their inherently greater complexity. The essence of science, however, is that we observe what there is to be olbserved whether it is difficult or not.
Furthermore, most of what we k,nncrw about the phenomena of ASC'.s has been obtained from untrained people, almost none of whom have shared the scientists' commitment to constantly reexamine their observations in grea,ter and greater detail. This should not imply that internal phenomena are inherently unabserv,able or unstable; we are comparing the first observations of internal phenomena with observations of physical sciences that have undergone centuries of refinement.
We must consider one other problem of observation. One of the traditional idols of science, the "detached observer," has no place in dealijng with many internal phenomena of SoCs. Not only are the observer's perceptions selective, he may also affect the things he observes. We must try to understand the characteristics of each individual observer in order to compemate for them.
A recognition of the unreality of the detached observer in the psychological sciences is becoming widespread, under the topics of experimenter bias (8) and demand characteristics (9). A si,milar recognition long ago occurred in physics when it was realized that the observed was altered by the process of observation at suba.tomic levels. When we deal with ASC's where the observer is the experiencer of the ASC, this factor is of paramount importance. Knowing the characteristics of the observer can also confound the process of consensual validation, which I shall now consider.
Public Nature of Observation
Observations must be public in that they must be replicable by any properly trained observer. The experienced conditions that led to the report of certain experiences must be described in sufficient detail that others may duplicate them and consequently have experiences which meet criterla of identicality. That someone else may set up similar conditions but not have the same experiences proves that the original investigator gave an incorrect description of the conditions and observations, or that he was not aware of certain essential aspects of the conditions.
The physical~stic accretion to this rule of consensual validation is that, physical data being the only "real" data, internal phenomena must be reduced to physiological or behavioral data to become reliable or they will be ignored entirely. I believe most physical observations to be much more readily replicable by any trained observer because they are inherently simpler phenomena than internal ones. In principle, however, consensual validation of internal phenomena by a trained observer is quite possible.
The emphasis on public observations in science has had a misleading quality insofar as it implies that any intelligent man can replicate a scientist's abservations. This might have been true early in the history of science, but nowadays only the trained observer can replicate many observations. 1 cannot go into a modern physicist's laboratory and confirm his observations. Indeed, his talk of what he has found in his experiments (physicists seem to talk about innumerable invisible entities these days) would probably seem mystical to me, just as many descriptions of internal states sound mystical to those with a background In the physical sciences.
Given the high complexity of the phenomena associated with ASC's, the need for replication by trained observers is exceptionally important. Since it generally takes 4 to 10 years of intensive training to produce a scientist in any of our conventional sciences, we should not be surprised that there has been very little reliability of observations by untrained observers of ASC phenomena.
Further, for the state-specific sciences that I propose should be established, we cannot specify the requirements that would constitute adequate training. These would only be determined after considerable trial and error. We should also recognize that very few people might complete the training successfully. Thus consensual validation may be restricted by the fact that only observers in the same ASC are able to communicate adequately with each other, and they may not be able to communicate adequately to someone in a different SoC, say normal wnsciousness (10).
Theorizing
A scientist may theorize about his observations as much as he wishes to, but the theory he develops must consistently account for all that he has observed, and should have a logical structure that other scientists can comprehend (but not necessarily accept).
The requirement to theorize logically and consistently with the data is not as simple as it looks, however. Aay logic consists of a basic set of assumptions and a set of rules for manipulating information, based on these assumptions. Change the assu,mptions, or change the rules, and there may be entirely different outcomes from the same data. A paradigm, too, is a logic: it has certain assumptions and rules for working within these assumptions. By changing the paradigm, altering the SoC, the nature of theory building may change radically. Thus a person in SoC 2 might come to very different conclusions about the nature of the same events that he observed in SoC 1. An investigator in SoC 1 may comment on the comprehensibility of the second person's ideas from the point of view (paradigm) of SoC 1, but can say nothing about their inherent validity. A scientist who could enter either SoC 1 or SoC 2, however, could pronounce on the comprehensibility of the other's theory, and the adherence of that theory to the rules and logic of SoC 2. Thus, scientists trained in the same SoC may check on the logical validity of each other's theorizing. We have then the possibility of a state-specific logic underlying theorizing in \ arious SoC's.
Observable Consequences
Any theory a scientist develops must have observable consequences, and from that theory it must be possible to make predictions that can be verified by observation. If such verification is not possible, the theory must be considered invalid, regardless of its elegance, logic, or other appeal.
Ordinarily u-c think of empirical validation, of validation in terms of testable consequences that produce ph!,sical effects. but this is misleading. Any effect, uhether interpreted as physical or nonphysical, is ultimately an experience in the observer's mind. All that -is essentially required to validate a theor). is that it predict that "When a certain experience (observed condition) has occurred, another (predicted) kind of experience will follow, under specified experiential conditions." Thus a perfect:! scientific theory may be based on dara that have no physical existence.
State-Specific Sciences
We tend to envision the practice of science like this: centered around interest in some particular range of subject matter, a m a l l number of highly selected, talented. and rigorously trained people spend considerable time making detailed observations on the subject matter of interest. T k y may or may not have special p~ac-s (laboratories) or instiuments or methods to assist them in making finer observations. They speak to one another in a special language which they feel conveys precisely the important facts of their field. Using this language, they confirm and extend each other's knowledge of certain data basic to the field. They theorize about their basic data and construct elaborate systems. They validate these by recourse to further observation. These trained people all have a long-term commitment to the constant refinement of observation and extension of theory. Their activity is frequently incomprehensible to laymen.
This general description is equally applicable to a variety of sciences, or areas that could become sciences, whether we called such areas biology, physics, chemistry, psychology, understanding of mystical states, or druginduced enhancement of cognitive processes. The particulars of research would look very different, but t,he basic scientific method running through all is the same.
More formally, I now propose the creation of various state-speci'fic sciences. If such sciences coul,d be created, we would have a group of highly skilled, dedicated, and trained practitioners able to achieve certain SoC's, and able to agree with one another that they have attained a common state. While in that SoC, they might then investigate other areas of interest, whether these be totally internal phenomena of that given state, the interaction of that state with external, physical reality, or people in other SoC's.
The fact that the experimenter should be able to function skillfully in the SoC itself for a state-specific science does not necessarily mean that he would al'ways be the su~bject. While he might often be the subject, observer, and experimenter si~multaneously, it would be quite possible for him to collect data from experimental manipulations of ot,her subjects in the SoC, and either be in that SoC himself at the time of data collection or be in that SoC himself for data reduction and theorizing.
Examples of some observations made and theorizing done by a scientist in a specific ASC wou1.d illustrate the nature of a proposed state-specific science. But this is not possible .because no state-specific sciences have yet been established (11). Also, any example that would make good sense to the readers of this article (who are, presumably, all in a normal SoC) would not really illustrate the uniqueness of a state-specific science. If it did make sense, it would be an example of a problem that could be approached adequately from ,both the ASC and normal SoC's, and thus it would be too easy to see the entire problem in terms of accepted scientific procedures for normal SoC's and miss the point about the necessity for developing state-specific sciences.
State-Specific Sciences and Religion Some aspects of organized religion appear to resemble state-specific sciences. T,here are techniques that allow the believer to enter an ASC and then have religious experiences in that ASC which are p r o d of his rdigious belief. People who have had such experiences usually describe them as ineffable in important ways-that is, as not fully comprehensible in a n ordinary SoC. Conversions at revivalistic meetings are the most common example of religious experiences occurring in various A X ' S induced by as intensely emotional atmosphere.
In examining ,the esoteric training systems of some religions, there seems to be even more resemblance between such .mystical ways an'd state-specific sciences, for here we often have the picture of devoted specialists, complex techniques, and repeated experiencing of the ASCk in order to f,urther religious knowledge.
Nevertheless the proposed statespecific sciences are not simply religion in a new guise. The use of A X ' S in religion may involve the kind of commitment to searching for truth that is needed for developing a state-specific science, but practically all the religions we know might be defined as statespecific technologies, operated in the service of a priori belief systems. The experiencers of ASC's in most religious contexts have already been thoroughly indoctrinated in a particular belief system. This belief system may then mold the content of the ASC's to create specific experiences which reinforce or validate the belief system.
The crucial distinction between a religion utilizing ASC's and a state-specific science is the commitment of the scientist to reexamine constantly his own ,belief system and to question the obvious in spite of its ixtellectual or m otional appeal to hi;^. Investigators of ASC',s wou1,d certainly encounter an immense variety of phenomena labeled religious experience or mystical revelation during the development of statespecific sciences, but .they would have to remain committed ,to examining these phenomena more carefiully, sha'ring their observations and techniques with colleagues, and subjecting the beliefs (hypotheses, theories) that result from such experiences to the requirement of leading to testable predictions. 1.n practice, .because we are aware of the immense emotional power of mystical experiences, this would be a difficult task, but it is one that will have to be undertaken by disciplined investigators if we are to understand various ASC's. The area labeled 0,0, permits direct observation in both sciences. Area TIT, permits theoretical inferences about common subject matter from the two perspectives. I n area OIT,, by contrast, the theoretical propositions of statespecific science number 2 are matters of direct observation for the scientist in SoC number 1, and vice versa for the area T,O,. State-specific science number 3 consists of a body of observation and theory exclusive to that science and has no overlap with the other two sciences: it neither confirn~s, denies, nor complements them.
Relationship between State-Specific Sciences
It would be naively reductionistic to say that the work in one state-specific science valirlates or invalidates the work in a second state-specific science; I prefer to say that two different statespeci,fic sciences, where they overlap, provide quite different points of view with respect to certain kinds of theories and data, and thus complement (12) each other. The proposed creation of state-specific sciences neither validates nor invalidates the activities of normal consciousness sciences (NCS). The possibility of developing certain statespecific sciences means only that certain kinds of phenomena may be handled more adequately within these potential new sciences.
Interrelationships more complex than those that are illustrated in Fig. 1 
A current example of such inieraction is the fin'ding that in Zen meditation ( a highly developed disci,pline in Japan) there are physiological correlates of meditative experiences, such as decreased frequency of alpha-rhythm, which can also be prod;~ced by means of instrumentally aided fzed.back-1ear.ning techniques (14). This finding might elucidate some of the processes peculiar to each discipline.
Individual Differences
A widespread and misleading assumption th2t hinders the development of state-specific sciences and confuses their interrelationships is the assumption that because two people are normal (not certified insane), their ordinary SoC's are essentially the same. In reality I suspect that there are enormous differences between the SoC's of some normal people. Because societies train people to behave and communicate along socially approved lines, tahese differences are covered up.
For example, some people think in images, others in words. Some can voluntarily anesthetize parts of their body, most cannot. Some recall past events by imaging the scene and looking at the relevant details; others use complex verbal processes with no images.
This means that person A may be able to observe certain kinds of experiential data that person B cannot experience in his ordinary SoC, no matter how hard B tries. There may be several consequences. Person B may think that A is insane, too imaginative, or a liar, or he may feel inferior to A. Person A may also feel himself odd, if he takes B as a standard of normality.
In some cases, B may be able to enter an ASC and there experience the sorts of things that A has reported to him. A realm of knowledge that is ordinary for A is then specific for an A X for B. Similarly, some of the experiences of B in his ASC may not be available for direct observation by A in his ordinary SoC.
The phenomenon of synesthesia can again serve as an example. Some individuals possess this ability in their ordinary SoC, most do not. Yet 56 percent of a sample of experienced marijuana users experienced synesthesia at least occasionally (3) while in the drug-induced ASC.
Thus we may conceive of bits of knowled.ge that are specific for an A X for one individual, part of ordinary consciousness for another. Arpuments over the usefulness of thc concept of states of conscjousness may rellect dilferences in the structure of the ordinary SoC of various investigators. Another important source of individual differences, little understood at present, is the degree to which an individual may first make a particular observation or form a concept in one SoC and then be able to reexperience or comprehend it in another SoC. That is, many items of information which were state-specific when observed initially may be learned and somehow transferred (fully or partially) to another SoC. Differences across in,dividuals, various combinations of SoC's, an,d types of esperience will probably be enormous.
I have only outlined the complexities created by individual differences in normal SoC's and have used the normal SoC as a baseline for comparison with ASC's; but it is evident that every SoC must eventually be compared against every other SoC.
Problems, Pitfalls, and Personal Perils
If we use the practical experience of Western man with ASC's as a guide, the development of state-specific sciences will be beset by a number of difficulties. These difficulties will be of two kinds: general methodological problems stemming from the inherent nature of some ASC's; and those concerned with personal peril, to the investigator. I shall discuss state-related problems first.
The first important problem in the proposed development of state-specific sciences is the obvious perception of truth. In many ASC's, one's experience is that one is obviously and lucidly experiencing truth directly, without question. An immediate result of this may be an extinction of the desire for further questioning. Further, this experience of obvious truth, while not necessarily preventing the individual investigator from further examining his data, may not arouse his desire for consensual validation. Since one of the greatest strengths of science is its insistence on consensual validation of basic data, this can be a serious drawback. Investigators attempting to develop states~pecific sciences will have to learn to distrust the obvious.
A second major problem in developing state-specific sciences is that in some One way of looking at this problem is to consider any such vivid imagi n i n g~ as potential effects: they are data, in t,he sense that what can be vividly imagined in a given SoC is important to know. It may not be the case that anything can be imagined with equal facility, and the relationships bet,ween what can be imagined may show a l wful pattern.
More generally, the way to approach this problem is to realize that it is not unique to ASC's. One c a n . have all sorts of illusions, and misperceptions in our ordinary SoC. Before the rise of modern physical science, all sorts of things were imagined about t,he nature of the physical world that could not be directly refuted. The same techniques that eliminated these illusions in the physical sciences will also eliminate then1 in state-specific sciences dealing with nonphysical data-that is, all observations will have to be subjected to consensual validation and all their theoretical consequences will have to be examined. Insofar as experiences are purely arbitrary imaginings, those that do not show consistent patterns and cannot be replicated will be distinguished from those phenomena which do show general lawfulness.
The effects of this enhanced vividness of imagination in some ASC's will be complicated further by two other important problems, namely, experi'menter bias (8, 9 ) , and the fact thalt one person's illusion in a given ASC can sometimes be communicated to another person in the same ASC so that a kind of false consensual validation results. Again, the only long-term solution to this would be the requirement that predictions based on concepts arising from various experiences be verified experientially.
A third major problem is that statespecific sciences probably cannot be developed for all ASC's: some ASC's may depend on or result from genuine deterioration of observational and reasoning abilities, or a deterioration of volition. Th'ose SoC's for which state-specific sciences might well be developed will be discussed later, but it should be made clear that the development of each science should result from trial an'd error, and not from a priori decisions based on reasoning in our ordinary SoC's.
A fourth major problem is that of ineffability. Some experiences are ineffable in the sense that: (i) a person may experience them, but be unable to express or conceptualize them adequately to himself; (ii) while a person may be able to conceptualize an experience to himself he may not be able to communicate it adequa'tely to anyone else. Certain phenomena of the first type may simply be inaccessible to scientific investigation. Phenomena of the second type may be accessible to scientific investigation only insofar as we are willing to recognize that a science, in the sense of following most of the basic rules, may exist only for a single person. Insofar as such a solitary science would lack aU the advantages gained by consensual validation, we could not expect it to have as much power and rigor as conventional scientific endeavor.
Many phenomena which are now considered ineffable may not be so in reality. This may be a matter of our general lack of experience with ASC's and the lack of an adequate language for communicating about ASC phenomena. In most well-developed languages the major part of the vocabulary was developed primarily in adaptation to survival in the physical world.
Finally, we should recognize the possibility that various phenomena of ASC's may be too complex for human beings to understand. T,he phenomena may depend on or be affected by so many variables that we shall never understand them. In the history of science, however, many phenomena which appeared too complex at first were eventually comprehensible.
Personal Perils
The personal perils that an investigator will face in attempting to develop a state-specific science are of two kinds, those associated with reactions colloquially called a bad trip and a good trip, respectively.
Bad trips, in which an extremely unpleasant, emotional reaction is experienced in an ASC, and in which there are possible long-term adverse consequences on a person's personal adjustment, often stem from the fact that our upbringing has not prepared us to undergo radical alterations in our ordinary SoC's. We are dependen't on stability, we fear the unknown, and \ \ e develop personal rigiditiez and various kinds of personal and social taboos. It is traditional in our society to consider ASC's as signs of insanity; ASC's therefore cause great fears in those who experience them.
In many ASC's, defenses against unacceptable personal impulses may become partially or wholly ineffective, so the person feels flooded with traumatic material that he cannot handle. All these things result in fear and avoidance of ASC's, and make it difficult or impossible for sonie individuals to function in an ASC in a way that is consistent with the development of a state-specific science. Maslow ( 1 5 ) has discussed these as pathologies of cognition that seriously interfere with the scientific enterprise in general, as well as ordinary life. In principle. adequate selection and training could minimize these hazards for at least sonie people.
Good trips may also endanger an investigator. A trip may produce experiences that are so rewarding that they interfere with the scientific activity of the investigator. The perception of obvious truth, and its effect of eliminating the need for further investigation or consensual validation have already been mentioned. Another peril comes from the ability to imagine or create vivid experiences. They may be so highly rewarding that the investigator does not follow the rule of investigating the obvious regardless of his personal satisfaction with results. Similarly, his attachment to good feelings, ecstasy, and the like, and his refusal to consider alternative conceptualizations of these, can seriously stifle the progress of investigation.
These personal perils again emphasize the necessity of developing adequate training programs for scientists who wish to develop state-specific sciences. Although it is difficult to envision such a training program, it is evident that much conventional scientific training is contrary to what would be needed to develop a state-specific science, because it tends to produce rigidity and avoidance of personal involvement with subject matter, rather than open-mindedness and flexibility. Much of the training program would have to be devoted to the scientist's understanding of himself so that the (unconscious) effects of his personal biases will be minimized during his investigations of an ASC.
Many of us know that there have been cases where scientists, after becoming personally involved with ASC's, have subsequently become very poor scientists or have experienced personal psychological crises. It would be preniature, however, to conclude that such unfortunate consequences cannot be avoided by proper training and discipline. In the early history of the physical sciences we had many fanatics who were nonobjective about their investigations. Not all experiencers of various ASC's develop pathology as a result: indeed, many seem to become considerably more mature. Only from actual attempts to develop state-specific sciences will we be able to determine the actual SoC's that are suitable for development, and the kinds of people that are best suited to such work (16).
Prospects
I believe that an examination of hman history and our current situation provides the strongest argument for the necessity of developing state-specific sciences. Throughout history man has been influenced by the spiritual and mystical factors that are expressed (u.sually in watered-down form) in the religi.ons that attract the masses of people. Spiritual and mystical experiences are primary phenomena of various ASC's: because of such experiences, untold num,bers of both the noblest and most horrible acts of which people are capable have been committed. Yet in all the time that Western science has existed, no concerted attempt has been made to understand these ASC phenomena in scientific terms.
It was the h'ope of many that religions were simply a form of superstition that would be left behind in our "rational" age. Not only has this hope failed, but our own understanding of the nature of reasoning now makes it clear that it can never be fulfilled. Reason is a tool, and .a tool that is wielded in the service of assumptions, beliefs, and needs which are not themselves su'bject to reason. The irrational, or, better yet, the arational, will not disappear from the h.uman situation. Our immense success in the development of the physical sciences has not been particularly su-,cessful in formulating better philosophies of life, or increasing our real knowledge of ourselves. The sciences we have developed to date are not very human sciences. T.hey tell us how to d o things, but gi,ve us no scientific insights on ques-disappear, but in which some experiparameters of the pattern that constitute it, not by the particular technique of inducing tions of what to do, what not to do, mentation can be carried out if special ,hat for bme AS^^^ can be induced or why to do things. The youth of today and mature scientists in increasing numbers are turning to meditation, oriental religions, and personal use of psychedelic drugs. The phenomena encountered in these ASC's provide more satisfaction and are more relevant to the formulation of philosophies of life and deciding upon appropriate ways of living, than "pure reason" (17). My own immpressions are that very large num.bers of scientists are now personally exploring ASC's, but few have begun to connect this personal exploration with thei,r scientific activities.
It is difficult to predict what the chances are of developiag state-specific sciences. Our knowledge is still too diffuse and dependent on our normal SoC's. Yet I think it is probable that state-specific sciences can be developed for such S C s as auto-hypnosis, meditative states, lucid dreaming, marijuana intoxication, LSD i,ntoxication, selfremem,bering, reverie, and biofeedbackinduced states ( 1 8 ) . In all of these SoC's, volition seems to be retained, so that the observer can indeed carry out experiments on himself or others or both. Some SoC's, in which the volition to experiment during the state may conditions are prepared before the state is entered, m l~h t be alcohol intoxication. ordinar! dreaming. hypnogogic and hypnopornpic states, and high dreams ( 1 8 ) . It is not clear whether other ASC's nould be suitable for developing state-specific sciences or whether mental deterioration would be too great. Such questions will only be answered by experiment.
I have nothing against religious and mystical groups. Yet I suspect that the vast majority of them have developed compelling belief systems rather than state-specific sciences. Will scientific method be extended to the development of state-specific sciences so as to improve our human situation? Or will the immense power of ASC's be left in the hands of man! cults and sects? I hope that the development of state-specific sclences will be our goal.
9. M. Orne, Amer. Psychol. 17, 776 (1962). 10. A state-specific scientist might find his own work somewhat incomprehensible when he was not in that SoC because of the phenomenon of state-specific memory-that is, not enough of his work would transfer to his ordinary Sd: to make it comprehensible, even though it would make perfect sense when he was again in the ASC in which he did his scientific work. 11. "Ordinary consciousness science" is not a good example of a "pure" state-specific science because many important discoveries have occurred during ASC's, such as reverie, paradlgm in a Kuhnian sense) is implied which suggests that we look for differences in the set of rules that the various states of consciousness offer. Perhaps the first priority would be to establish whether altered states of consciousness have the far-reaching effects that Tart suggests. D o they really alter the psyche in its most profound sense by changing the very foundation of its system of logic, or do they merely produce variations at some more superficial, say, sensory, level?
If we give Tart his point and assume that the change is profound, then several consequences follow, some of which may be problematical. F o r example, Tart assumes that communication between states of consciousness is possible. A scientist, he says, could pass judgment on a theory developed in one state of consciousness (SoC 1 ) while he occupied another (SoC 2 ) . But could he? Imagine that a certain mathematician in SoC 2 discovers a proof of Fermat's last theorem. H e now slips back into SoC 1. Suppose that, in strict Godel fashion, Fermat's last theorem is undecidable in SoC 1. If the mathematician wants to relish the beauties of his proof he must slip back into SoC 2, since the proof is not possible, hence nonexistent, under the system governing SoC 1. Perhaps SoC 1 and SoC 2, since they belong to the same experimental milieu, merge into SoC 3. The difficulty here is that SoC 3 might possibly be governed by a system of logic based on contradic-
All of this points to the following consequences. If altered states of consciousness produce fundamental changes in the sense used here, then (i) the states may merge, perhaps resulting in more subjective confusion than that produced by either state taken singly, or (ii) the states would remain aoncommunicative, and one would have to pass from one state to another in order to savor the knowledge that the systems had to offer. Alter-states might offer predictability but not intuitive understanding-a situation acceptable to the pragmatist perhaps, but not to the esthete.
On the other hand, altered states of consciousness may have only a superficial effect, reaching, say, no further than the level of sensory or perceptual interpretation of physical stimuli. This .is perhaps close to what mathematical logicians call metalanguage, or the use of one language (one system of symbols) to talk about another. Consider the following thought experiment: Identical twins with identical backgrounds of experience are subjected to two different states of consciousness. We arrange matters so that the sensory (perceptual?) experience in both states are the same. Will the inferences, the intuitive or subjective impressions of reality, be quite different to the two observers? An answer in the affirmative would give us reason to establish state-specific sciences. This would not be a trivial finding, for if we had access to even a finite number of differcent logics, then our intellectual powers would be increased by several orders of magnitude. On the other hand, if altered states of consciousness affected only sensory interpretations (metalanguage~), then the various systems of subjective inferences would not be fundamentally altered, and different systems of science for different states of consciousness would be redundant.
THADDEUS M. COWAN Departtnent o f Psychology, Kansas State University, Manhattan 66506
Scientific endeavor from its begbnning has been committed to a rational explanation of human experiences and activities, and of events and phenomena in our environment. Scientists may thus be expected to explore and to seek rational explanations of all aspects of human consciousness, as Tart proposes.
I
Such rational explanations, both of ourselves and of our environments, tend to be in terms of physics and chemistry, since these scientific disciplines have optimum measurable precision. For biology, this was manifestoed in 1847, to include consciousness, by Carl Ludwig, Emile Dubois-Reymond, and Hermann von Helmholtz. T h e results, allowing for time, have been amazing. There seem to be n o pressing reasons to turn to any other way of approaching altered states of consciousness scientifically, as proposed by Tart. His "state-specific sciences" imply a n esoteric in-group of specialists with a n unintelligible jargon who would tend to indulge themselves in emotionally oriented irrational speculation.
Guidelines for scientific effort are generally agreed upon by scientists. They seem to be adequate for the rational exploration and explanation of such altered states of consciousness as sleep, meditative trances, and druginduced hallucinations. Tart's proposals, however sincere, add merely confusion, fallacious reasoning, and semimystical hope to the orderly, though slow, scientific process of reaching tentative explanations and understandings of how our complex brains function. Irrationality is incompatible with scientific endeavor, except as a phenomenon to be explored rationally. Lest fuzzy-headed chemical adventurers think Tart's article provides them with excuse for availing themselves of effortless entertainment, let me recite a little story in the style of a fable which carries nature's eternal message of "no free meals."
A wild pig deep in the jungle of Africa had i.t made. Being omnivorous in a land where nature is prodigal, he had a nearly endless assortment of fruits, nuts, roots, and even truffles with which to titillate his senses. A wonderful supply of incongruous input ( 1 ) available with only a small expenditure of effort. In season he received atmospheric messages from female pigs which further added to his state of delight. The other animals of the jungle bothered him very little, as he had sharp hooves and strong tusks. There was, nevertheless, the threat of lions, ,but his senses, attuned to the real world in which he lived, kept him i'nformed of the lion situation and so provided him with safety. Both his observations and his instincts had taught him to fear the lions and to seek shelter whenever his senses told him lions were in the vicinky.
One day in making his rounds he came upon a strange bush loaded with goofyberries. H e sampled a few and found them not disagreeable. Soon the jungle began to chamnge. Somehow it looked different. Yes, everything in it was getting smaller. One could walk through it w,ith seven-league boots. H e felt like a giant-almost a god. Suddenly his nose picked up a few warning molecules. Lion! But, under the influence of the goofyberries, the signal came through distorted. "The lion is my friend! H e loves me and I love him. Why should I run and h,ide? Ah, I see him now. H e looks so small and funny, like a pussycat. He's crouching down now to spring. H e wants to play with me. Oh, this such great fun! Wheeee!" Scream! Silence! Blood and death.
It's still that kind of a world, with a thin veneer of civilization over the jungle. There are no free meals in the long run. Or free trips either. Statistically, if not individually, the weak and foolish perish in accordance with a set of rules now some 3 billion years old. That law of life is survival of the fittest. For an animal to deliberately handicap his senses and data processing equipment which evolution has given him to see the world as it is in exchange for some "effortless" entertainment has to be, consciously or not, suicidal. The probability is enormous that all altered states of consciousness are defective. The relation between drunken driving and highway carnage should be sufficient reminder.
Tart may have a valid interest in studying mental abnormalities, whether naturally occurring or induced by drugs. Otherwise, caveat lector.
ALBERT B. BOOTH 4 Nelson Lane, Jekyll Island, Georgia 31520
Tart's views on state-specific sciences in different states of consciousness should be applauded, as he recognizes and legitimatizes the differing realities of different people. In the wider world, however, this problem is analogous to some of the issues raised in anthropological linguistics by Sapir and Whorf ( 1 ) a couple of generations ago.
In modern parlance, the problem might be phrased as how to "get into" the minds and logics of the speakers of other languages: people who live in somewhat different states of consciousness as they live in different experiential worlds. By observing groups of people who share different states of consciousness from our own, one gains a sense that his own normal state of consciousness must be related to those around him, and not be in any sense a direct given of human nature; that is, what we call consciousness is in part a sociocultural statement.
I d o not agree with Tart that we need state-specific sciences. The most productive approach to understanding different s.tates of consciousness is to set up a wide comparative science which will try to translate different states, much as we are trying to understand the nature of ,the varying cultural states of consciousness that we call different cultural rea1,ities. T o extend the comparative paradigm still further, it seems likely that ,this is not a very different problem from attempting t o understand the different cognitive organizations of different species.
Scientific development is not, in my opinion, directly tied to ordinary states of consciousness. I,t moves to new paradigms by attending to counter intuitive thought; it changes through reconceptualization and new awareness. Once one has achieved o r arrived at a new conceptualization, an "aha" experience, his experiential reality is no longer as it was previously. Scientific insight is much like an altered state of consciousness (ASC). A remarkable attribute of science is that its language seems to be sufficiently general to incorporate new modes of ideation and observation.
Perhaps the problem can be approached as a comparative one by looking at the array of different experiential realities, trying to discover the logic by which they work and to translate this into a metalanguage which is about consciousness.
In working with Mexican Tzotzil Indians some years ago, I discovered that they seemed to regard their true reality as occurr,ing during what we call sleep. Their true soul, or Nagual, was then free to roam the world and see in the deepest, most visionary sense. The normal consciousness world of everyday waking life seemed to be mainly i'nterpretive commentary o f their dream states (from our point of view). The group seemed more likely to act in terms of peoples' reported visions than in terms of their normal consciousness states.
Part of Tzotzil logic is almost 180° out of phase with ours; but it does seem to be potentially understandable to us, and investigatable. We must be willing to accept the premises of its particular reality and learn to work in its observational terms. Perha.ps i.t would, as Whorf claimed for the Hopi (I, p. 57), develop its own independent and interesting science. The important fact seems to be that there are ways in which we can use our experiential reality to understand theirs. I disagree with Tart's approach, which would appear to enhance the differences between different ASC's and legitimate the possibility of a potentially infinite set of disparate, unconnectable realities and sciences. It is more productive to search for common translatory devices with which to understand cross-cultural, cross-species, cross-state communication.
HARVEY Abraham Maslow once said that if the only tool you have is a hammer, you tend to treat everything as if it were a nail ( I ) . More formally, psychological observations indicate that the overt logic o r rationality of all of us often turns out to be rationalization in the service of nonconscious, implicit assumptions and needs. Some of these rationalizations have commanded the intellectual and emotional loyalty of millions of followers for hundreds of years. Believing ,that there is some form of complete rationality which frees us from the power of implicit assumptions is noble, but questionable, and diverts us from confronting the issue of what our implicit assumptions are and how they affect us. Understanding and confronting such assumptions may be quite difficult, for they are tied in with emotional reward and punishment systems conditioned in us during the process of socialization.
In spite of Leake's fa'ith that chemistry and physics are the optimal explanatory systems, 1 a m not impressed with our current scientific knowledge of states of consciousness (SoC's), our rate of progress, or the hope of chemical and physical explanations of SoC's. Chemistry and physics provide some useful insights, and such conventional investigation should be continued. My proposal to develop state-specific sciences (SSS's) is not a call to abandon our useful hammer, but to develop additional tools for dealing with problems that don't act like nails.
Many of the comments of Cowan, Leake, Booth, and Sarles seem based on an implicit assumption which is very common in the scientific community. This is that our ordinary, normal, so-called rational SoC is the best one for surviving on this planet and understanding the universe, and that all altered SoC's are subnormal, irrational, or pathological to various degrees. This is a value judgment. One can find many examples of the products of a world supposedly run from a normal SoC that give reason to question this assumption, such as nuclear weapons or bacteriological warfare. It is also a common psychological ploy for each of us to support this assumption by defining our own ordinary SoC as normal and that of everyone whose behavior displeases us as abnormal or altered; this ploy, while ego-syntonic, is hardly scientific.
Cowan misrepresents me in saying a scientist ". . . could pass judgment on a theory developed in one state of consciousness (SoC 1) while he occupied another (SoC 2)," implying no need for SSS's. My original statement was that one could certainly comment on a theory developed in another SoC, but such comment said something about differences between SoC's, not about the validity of the SoC 1 theory from the point of view of SoC 1. If the proof of Fermat's last theorem (to use Cowan's example) is comprehensible to and agreed upon by all trained scientists who can enter SoC 1, even though they themselves cannot comprehend it while they are in SoC 2, that is not only a scientific advance, but an excellent illustration of the need for and potentialities of SSS's. The hope expressed by Cowan and Sarles that there is some SoC in which all the observations and theorizing of other SoC's could be comprehended as special subsets is laudable: perhaps this is what the term enlightenment means. But this hope should not blind us to (i) the fact that we do not know of such a state now; (ii) the probability that our ordinary SoC is not such a state; and (iii) the need to develop SSS's now as an approach to social problems such as drug use, as well as for inherent scientific interest, rather than avoiding this issue by assuming that some extension of ordinary SoC science will eliminate the need to deal directly with altered SoC's. The speculation that altered SoC's may be ultimately reducible to simply alterations in sensory processing does not fit current knowledge about them and can also function as a rationalization to avoid looking at the need to develop SSS's.
I share Booth's concern about goofyberries. Many human beings act stupidly and suffer the consequences. Yet even a bird-brain like a pigeon can learn to discriminate seven different conditions and behave in an appropriate, rewarded fashion, so I have confidence that a large-brained creature like a scientist can learn to function in an SoC appropriate to the conditions he is in. Kekule used the altered SoC of dreaming to arrive at the inspiration for the structure of benzene ( 2 ) , but he was intelligent enough not to go to sleep in a lion's den.
CHARLES T. TART Department o f Psychology, University o f California, Davis 95616
Uvdate on state-svecific sciences.
The c~n c e~t u a l i z a i i o n of states of ~onsciousness, usin a systems theory at the Davis campus of the university of ~alifoinia, is gradually making reprints o his published journal articles and miscellaneous papers available, via anonvmous f t~. to whoever is interested. These are mostlv from scientific iournals. but b e eneraIly quite readable to the educated layman. As of August 20, i995, 30+ I articles ave been posted. The following are examples of the kinds of topics:
-experiences in altered states of consciousness as fundamental sources of value in Western civilization, underlying religion -investigating altered states by the development of state-specific sciences -ESP functioning could be trained to become reliable by using basic psychological principles of learning -precognition works an order of magnitude less well than real time ESP under laboratory conditions -psychics' own fears of psychic abilities -psychological wa s of dealing with fear of psi -perniciousness o Y bias in apparently objective science -marijuana intoxication and psi functioning Another 100+ articles will be posted over the next year as they are scanned in and formatted as ASCII files. The file "currentcontents" in the ftp server will indicate what has been added.
Computer users with access to the Internet can access the archive as follows:
Connect to ftp server, "ftp.ucdavis.edu". (Don't type the "s) Log in as username "anonymous". Send your e-mail address as the ident/ assword string. (Don't type the "s)
cd to P pub/fztart.
A "dir" command will show you what is available. A "get" command will retrieve documents. The file "current-contents" will be updated regularly, showing what papers are available, often with an abstract of each. People with a Web browser pro ram can access the archive with the address ftp://ftp.ucdavis.edu 7 pub/fztart Please forward the above announcement to whatever networks and individuals you think would be interested. Thank you.
